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Abstract. This article examines the inﬂuence of board of director composition and
characteristics on real estate investment trust (REIT) shareholder wealth as measured
by ﬁrm market-to-book ratios. Results show that increased outside director
representation on the board leads to increased market-to-book ratios up to a point.
However, as outside representation becomes too large, the market discounts REIT shares.
In addition, a positive relationship is observed between REIT market-to-book ratios and
the dollar values of director ownership, providing support for alignment beneﬁts
associated with increased director stock ownership.
Introduction
The board of directors are appointed the responsibility of ensuring that management
acts in the shareholders’ best interest. This monitoring role involves activities such as
ratifying top management decisions, hiring and ﬁring senior managers, and approving
compensation packages for these managers. Shareholders rely on outside directors to
protect their interest from insiders pursuing non-value-maximizing agendas.
This agency problem may be particularly troublesome for real estate investment trusts
(REITs), a form of closed-end mutual fund that invests primarily in real estate-related
assets.1 Transactions involving real property can be difﬁcult for shareholders to
evaluate and monitor because of the problems involved in determining fair market
values. Unlike the securities market where closed-end mutual fund investments are
made, the commercial real estate market consists of a wide range of heterogeneous,
illiquid assets. An outside director must have a keen understanding of a REIT’s
geographic market, including economic trends, price appreciation expectations,
ﬁnancing information, environmental concerns and other property-speciﬁc
information.2
This article examines the inﬂuence of REIT directors on shareholder wealth by
directly measuring the shareholder pricing of board characteristics. Shareholder
pricing of board characteristics is measured using a ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio, where
the market-to-book ratio is deﬁned as the market value of the ﬁrm divided by the
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replacement value of the ﬁrm’s assets. If the market perceives that certain board
characteristics are effective mechanisms for maximizing shareholder wealth and for
controlling agency costs, a positive relation should exist between REIT market-to-
book ratios and levels of these alignment and monitoring mechanisms.
Outside Directors and Firm Monitoring
Despite the widely perceived role of outside directors as ﬁrm monitors, the true impact
of these outside directors on ﬁrm value is open to debate. Fama and Jensen (1983)
contend that outside directors provide a means to monitor management activities
through an increased focus on ﬁrm performance because they have an incentive to
maximize the value of their human capital by maintaining their reputation for being
effective monitors. Brickley and James (1987) support this contention, providing
evidence that increased outside director representation reduces management perk
consumption, while Weisbach (1988) reports that outside directors are more inclined
than inside directors to ﬁre senior managers for poor performance.
However, Patton and Baker (1987) question the resolve of outside directors to actively
monitor top management who often select them as candidates for their board seats.
Mangel and Singh (1993) point out that incentives exist for collusion between outside
directors and top management to the detriment of outside shareholders. Furthermore,
these managers can censor ﬁrm information that outside directors receive, thereby
decreasing the value of their expertise and monitoring skills. Other studies question
the relevance of outside director monitoring in the presence of other bonding and
monitoring mechanisms such as the market for corporate control, the managerial labor
market, ownership structure and properly deﬁned compensation packages.3
Evidence provided by McIntosh, Rogers, Sirmans and Liang (1994) shows an inverse
relation between the probability of top management changes and share-price
performance for REITs. These results reveal that internal monitoring actions by
directors can create shareholder wealth in REITs and support the widely held belief
that outside directors serve to enhance shareholder value.4
REITs are often observed trading at a discount from their net asset value. That is, the
ratio of the market value of equity to the underlying net asset value of the trust is
less than one. These ﬁndings indicate that REIT investors perceive certain costs that
lead them to price REIT shares at a discount relative to REIT underlying asset values.
An adequate explanation for these discounts in REITs has not been forthcoming.
However, evidence concerning discounts observed in stock and bond closed-end
mutual funds identify high agency costs as a cause for increased fund discounts.
In addition to traditionally cited agency costs such as excess compensation, perk
consumption and insider trading, other avenues exist for wealth expropriation by well-
positioned REIT insiders. Ofﬁcers, directors and large shareholders may siphon money
away from shareholders through advising agreements, consulting contracts, property
management agreements or exclusive right-to-sale agreements.BOARD OF DIRECTOR MONITORING AND FIRM VALUE IN REITS 413
Transactions involving related parties can be particularly troubling for outside
shareholders because it is difﬁcult to determine the level of wealth expropriation by
ﬁrm insiders. Providing evidence on the potential impact of these related transactions
on shareholder wealth, Hsieh and Sirmans (1991) ﬁnd that captive REITs
underperform noncaptive REITs.5 Analysis by Ang and Friday (1997) of the
magnitude of these transactions for REITs reveals that the dollar values involved can
be substantial, totaling billions of dollars and representing over 10% of average annual
REIT asset value.
Data and Initial Evidence
A sample of REITs for the period 1980 through 1994 is obtained from the National
Association of Real Estate Investment Trust Factbooks. REITs are classiﬁed as either
equity, hybrid or mortgage REITs according to their Factbook classiﬁcations.6 To be
included in the sample, a REIT must have data available on the Compustat AFC, AIE
and AIR ﬁles and have proxy information available in the SEC Q-data ﬁles for any
one of the years being examined. This screening process provided information for at
least one year for seventy-ﬁve equity REITs, twenty hybrid REITs and forty mortgage
REITs.7
REIT Market-to-Book Ratios
Exhibit 1 contains descriptive statistics on sample sizes, market-to-book ratios and
board of director composition by year for each REIT type. On average, equity REITs
traded at a 13% premium, while hybrid and mortgage REITs combined traded at a
4% discount. Equity REITs traded at a premium in every year except 1991 when they
traded at a 19% discount. Exhibit 1 also shows that seven of the eight years hybrid
and mortgage REITs traded at a discount occurred after 1987.8
Equity REIT board sizes averaged 7.3 members, with an average of 50% being outside
directors. Outside director representation ranged from a low of 34% in 1992 to a high
of 60% in 1984 for equity REITs. Hybrid-mortgage REIT board sizes averaged 6.9
directors, with 48% being outsiders. The proportion of outsiders on hybrid-mortgage
REIT boards ranged from 36% to 57% across the sample period.
Board of Director Composition and Characteristics
Board of director composition is documented by categorizing directors as either
insiders, afﬁliated, or outsiders. In addition, REIT audit, compensation, investment
and nominating committee composition are documented. The North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) Statement of Policy for REITs
deﬁnes independent directors as ‘‘those directors who are not afﬁliated directly or
indirectly with the REIT, the sponsor, the advisor, or the property manager by
ownership interest in, employed by, business or professional relationship with, or
serves as an ofﬁcer or director of such company or an afﬁliated business entity of





















































Equity REIT Group Hybrid-Mortgage REIT Group
Year Number Market-to- Number of Outside Number Market-to- Number of Outside
Examined of REITs Book Ratio Directors Directors (%) of REITs Book Ratio Directors Directors (%)
1980 16 1.06 7.2 55 10 0.94 8.2 56
1981 16 1.09 8.0 57 12 0.99 9.1 57
1982 16 1.13 7.4 56 10 1.02 8.3 52
1983 20 1.21 7.6 56 11 1.06 8.3 36
1984 17 1.48 8.4 60 12 1.12 7.8 44
1985 14 1.17 7.1 46 15 1.14 6.9 38
1986 22 1.24 7.6 48 14 1.02 6.3 42
1987 36 1.20 7.3 54 27 1.04 6.3 50
1988 40 1.16 7.5 51 27 0.90 7.2 45
1989 41 1.20 7.5 51 30 0.93 6.9 54
1990 36 1.10 7.2 50 31 0.91 6.5 48
1991 37 0.81 7.1 45 27 0.72 7.0 51
1992 50 1.03 6.2 34 31 0.75 6.7 48
1993 27 1.23 7.8 52 19 0.84 6.1 52
1994 21 1.12 7.5 56 13 0.82 5.6 50
Total observations: Equity REITs 5 409 and Hybrid-Mortgage REITs 5 289. Equity REITs weighted average: market-to-book ratio 5 1.13, number of
directors 5 7.3 and % outside directors 5 50%. Hybrid-Mortgage REITs weighted average: market-to-book ratio 5 92%, number of directors 5 6.9
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immediate family of the director has one of the previously mentioned relationships
with the REIT or one of its afﬁliated companies.
Our analysis reﬁnes this deﬁnition by employing a three-way classiﬁcation scheme
similar to that employed by Byrd and Hickman (1992) to classify directors. Individuals
principally employed by the REIT, the REIT’s advisor or those engaged in ongoing
business relations with the REIT are considered inside directors. Directors that serve
as directors of companies afﬁliated with the REIT through a parent- or sister-company
relation but have no other association with the REIT are classiﬁed as afﬁliated
directors. Outside directors have no afﬁliation with the REIT other than their
directorship and shareholdings.
The level of stock ownership, the number of other positions held in addition to their
board seats and the tenure of each director at the REIT are also recorded. Directors
who have greater ownership of REIT stock, hold more outside positions and have
greater tenure should have more inﬂuence in the organization.
To evaluate the relation between REIT market-to-book ratios and REIT board
characteristics, the equity and hybrid-mortgage REIT samples are partitioned into two
groups according to their relative market-to-book ratios. The ﬁrst group consists of
REITs with high relative market-to-book ratios, while the second group contains
REITs with low market-to-book ratios. We employ standardized annual market-to-
book ratios using the following equation:
[MB(i,t) 2 MB(p,t)]/s(MB(p,t)),
where MB(i,t) is the market-to-book ratio of REIT i for time t, MB(p,t) is the average
market-to-book ratio of the same type REITs for time t and s(MB(p,t)) is the standard
deviation of the market-to-book ratios of the same type REITs for time t. The use of
standardized market-to-book measures controls for variation in market-to-book ratios
across time.
Summary statistics for board of director composition and director characteristics,
along with difference in means tests between the high and low market-to-book ratio
groups for the equity and hybrid-mortgage REIT samples, are reported in Exhibits 2
and 3. The high market-to-book equity REITs traded at a 50% premium, while the
low group traded at a 24% discount. High market-to-book hybrid-mortgage REITs
traded at a 15% premium, while their low market-to-book counterparts traded at a
31% discount. The proportions of high market-to-book REITs self administered is
signiﬁcantly higher than the number of low market-to-book REITs for both the equity
and hybrid-mortgage REIT groups.
Over the period examined, information is available for over 4,500 director-years of
service. The average number of directors on the board is signiﬁcantly higher for the
high market-to-book equity REITs than for their low market-to-book counterparts. In
addition, the percentage of both inside and outside directors is greater for the premium




















































Difference-in-Means Analysis of Board of Director Characteristics for Equity REITs with High and Low Relative
Market-to-Book Ratios
High Market-to-Book Group Low Market-to-Book Groups
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Difference t-Stat
Market-to-Book Ratio 205 1.5 0.5 204 0.8 0.3 0.7 NR
Panel A: REIT Control Structure
Self Administered 205 70.2% 45.8% 204 40.2% 49.2% 30.1%** 6.4
Number of Directors 205 7.8 2.6 204 6.8 2.0 1.0** 4.1
Inside Directors 205 40.9% 19.8% 204 37.6% 18.4% 3.2%* 1.7
Afﬁliated Directors 205 6.1% 17.8% 204 15.9% 28.6% 29.8%* 24.1
Outside Directors 205 53.0% 23.2% 204 46.5% 26.3% 6.5%** 2.7
Outsiders on Key Committees
Audit 162 73.2% 33.4% 170 65.5% 39.1% 7.7%* 1.9
Compensation 88 71.5% 30.2% 71 69.9% 36.4% 1.5% 0.3
Investment 25 63.9% 26.8% 28 72.2% 26.2% 28.26% 21.1
Nominating 28 52.4% 29.4% 27 52.9% 39.1% 20.50% 20.1
Panel B: REIT Ownership Structure
Average Director Stock Holdings
Insiders 205 11.1% 16.9% 204 13.0% 17.1% 22.0% 21.2
Afﬁliated 205 0.3% 1.1% 204 0.7% 1.4% 20.3%** 22.7
Outsiders 205 3.8% 6.6% 204 3.5% 8.5% 0.3% 0.5
Average Director Stock Blockholdings Over 5%
Insiders 205 6.6% 13.2% 204 12.2% 17.9% 25.6%** 23.6
Outsiders 205 1.0% 3.3% 204 1.4% 7.3% 20.4% 20.8
Number of
Shareholders
















































Difference-in-Means Analysis of Board of Director Characteristics for Equity REITs with High and Low Relative
Market-to-Book Ratios
High Market-to-Book Group Low Market-to-Book Groups
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Difference t-Stat
Panel C: REIT Director Characteristics
Total Outside Board Seats and Other Positions Held by Directors
Insiders 205 6.1 5.4 204 8.6 9.8 22.52** 23.2
Afﬁliated 205 1.6 5.7 204 4.7 10.5 23.09** 23.7
Outsiders 205 9.9 9.2 204 7.6 6.6 2.32** 2.9
Director Tenure
Insiders 200 12.1 7.3 191 7.8 5.5 4.29** 6.6
Afﬁliated 34 7.3 4.0 71 6.8 5.1 0.43 0.5
Outsiders 193 8.5 5.4 175 5.5 3.3 3.04** 6.6
**Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.




















































Difference-in-Means Analysis of Board of Director Characteristics for Hybrid-Mortgage REITs with High and Low
Relative Market-to-Book Ratios
High Market-to-Book Group Low Market-to-Book Groups
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Difference t-Stat
Market-to-Book Ratio 145 1.15 0.3 144 0.69 0.2 0.5 NR
Panel A: REIT Control Structure
Self Administered 145 25.5% 42.8% 144 13.9% 34.7% 11.6%** 2.5
Number of Directors 145 6.8 2.2 144 7.1 3.3 20.3 20.9
Inside Directors 145 40.7% 17.5% 144 45.1% 21.3% 24.5%* 22.0
Afﬁliated Directors 145 6.9% 15.5% 144 10.5% 19.4% 23.6%* 21.8
Outside Directors 145 52.5% 21.8% 144 44.4% 26.1% 8.1%** 2.9
Outsiders on Key Committees
Audit 126 84.9% 25.2% 105 69.2% 35.4% 15.8%** 3.8
Compensation 34 87.6% 15.6% 17 84.4% 29.2% 3.2% 0.4
Investment 12 57.2% 25.0% 31 60.1% 21.9% 22.9% 20.4
Nominating 26 88.9% 27.5% 9 81.6% 24.2% 7.3% 0.8
Panel B: REIT Ownership Structure
Average Director Stock Holdings
Insiders 145 7.2% 9.9% 144 12.9% 26.6% 25.7%* 22.4
Afﬁliated 145 1.0% 3.6% 144 0.6% 2.1% 0.4% 1.1
Outsiders 145 1.9% 4.1% 144 1.8% 2.8% 0.1% 0.2
Average Director Stock Blockholdings Over 5%
Insiders 145 5.6% 9.7% 144 5.2% 10.7% 0.5% 0.4
Outsiders 145 0.9% 2.8% 144 0.4% 1.6% 0.6%* 2.1
Number of
Shareholders
















































Difference-in-Means Analysis of Board of Director Characteristics for Hybrid-Mortgage REITs with High and Low
Relative Market-to-Book Ratios
High Market-to-Book Group Low Market-to-Book Groups
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Difference t-Stat
Panel C: REIT Director Characteristics
Total Outside Board Seats and Other Positions Held by Directors
Insiders 145 6.1 6.0 144 9.8 8.5 23.8** 24.4
Afﬁliated 145 1.2 4.6 144 3.5 8.8 22.3** 22.7
Outsiders 145 8.4 6.8 144 7.4 8.7 1.1 1.2
Director Tenure
Insiders 144 10.3 7.4 143 6.8 5.4 3.5** 4.6
Afﬁliated 30 6.8 3.8 52 5.6 5.0 1.2 1.2
Outsiders 142 6.3 4.5 123 5.7 4.0 0.6 1.2
**Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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premium group of the hybrid-mortgage REIT sample, while the proportion of outside
directors remains higher. Both low market-to-book equity REITs and hybrid-mortgage
REITs have a signiﬁcantly larger proportion of afﬁliated directors.9
Increased numbers of outside directors are associated with increased levels of
monitoring, while increased numbers of inside directors are associated with greater
expertise on ﬁrm operations. This positive difference for equity REITs provides
evidence of market pricing of both increased outside director representation on the
board as well as the increased expertise provided by inside directors. However, the
negative difference for the proportion of inside directors on premium hybrid-mortgage
REIT boards, combined with a positive difference for the proportion of outsiders on
these boards, indicates that the increased expertise of inside directors is valued far
less than the increased monitoring provided by outside directors.
Ownership as a percentage of the shareholder equity of afﬁliated directors is lower
for the equity REITs trading at a premium, while no signiﬁcant differences are
observed between inside and outside director ownership for the premium and discount
groups. This result contradicts arguments contending that increased director ownership
should be priced because director alignment is increased. In addition, hybrid-mortgage
REITs with low market-to-book ratios have higher levels of both inside and afﬁliated
director ownership, providing evidence that the market is pricing insider entrenchment
for these REITs.
The average number of positions, in addition to their board appointment held by inside
and afﬁliated directors for both equity and hybrid-mortgage REITs, is signiﬁcantly
lower for the premium group. One explanation for this result is that those directors
with fewer outside responsibilities are viewed as being more effective monitors
because they have more time to devote to the success of the REIT. Another
explanation is that the increased number of outside positions held by inside and
afﬁliated directors increases the opportunity for conﬂicts of interest when transactions
occur between these ﬁrms. The number of other positions held by outside directors
is signiﬁcantly higher for equity REITs trading at a premium. The number of other
positions held by a director is a proxy for director reputation within the business
community. This result indicates that the market places a premium on outside directors
with greater reputations as proxied by the number of other positions held by the
director. A similar relation does not hold for the hybrid-mortgage REIT group.
The tenure of inside directors is higher for equity REITs trading at a premium. Outside
director tenure is higher for the premium groups of both the equity and hybrid-
mortgage REIT samples. This result may be a function of the market pricing increased
experience and power, which increases the monitoring capability of these directors,
or it may be function of survivorship of directors from more successful REITs.
Analysis of Market Pricing of Board Composition and
Characteristics
To further examine the relation between REIT market-to-book ratios and ﬁrm board
characteristics, the following general ordinary least squares model is employed:BOARD OF DIRECTOR MONITORING AND FIRM VALUE IN REITS 421
Market-to-Book Ratio 5 ƒ(Board Composition and Characteristics).
Methodology employed by Friday and Peterson (1997) to examine REIT cross-
sectional return characteristics across time is used for this analysis. Regression
analysis is applied on a cross-sectional basis for each of the years examined. The
coefﬁcients for each of the explanatory variables from this series of regressions are
then averaged across time and a simple t-test is performed to determine if the average
is signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Panel A of Exhibit 4 provides results for the examination of the relation between
REIT market-to-book ratios and the proportion of outsiders on the board using a
piecewise regression for the equity and hybrid-mortgage REIT groups. Interpretation
of the coefﬁcient estimates for this model follow that of a standard piecewise
regression, with a single knot at 50% outside director representation. For cases where
outside director representation is less than 50%, the correct relation is represented by
the coefﬁcient estimate for %OUT , 50. However, to determine the relation between
REIT market-to-book ratios and board representation exceeding 50%, the coefﬁcient
reported for %OUT . 50 must be added to the coefﬁcient for %OUT , 50.
A positive relation is observed between REIT market-to-book ratios and outside
director representation as levels of outside board representation increase towards 50%
for the equity REIT group. However, a signiﬁcant negative relation is observed
between outside representation exceeding 50% and pricing for this group. These
results indicate that the market prices outside director representation up to a point,
then the marginal beneﬁts of increased monitoring provided by additional outside
directors is outweighed by the loss of expertise provided by inside directors.
Panel B of Exhibit 4 contain analysis of the market pricing of inside director
representation. No signiﬁcant relation is observed between REIT market-to-book ratios
and levels of inside director representation, contradicting the entrenchment hypothesis
that the market punishes ﬁrms with higher insider representation on the board.
Panel A of Exhibit 5 provides results for the analysis of the relation between REIT
market-to-book ratios and director ownership as a percentage of shareholder equity.
No signiﬁcant relationship exists between REIT market-to-book ratios and inside and
outside director ownership as a percentage of shareholder equity. However, a
signiﬁcant negative relation is found for afﬁliated director percentage ownership
providing evidence of potential agency conﬂicts.
Panel B of Exhibit 5 shows the relationship between REIT market-to-book ratios and
the natural log of total dollar values of director stockholdings. The dollar value of
director holdings represent an absolute measure of the wealth at stake in the ﬁrm for
each director. A signiﬁcant positive relation exists between REIT market-to-book
ratios and the dollar values of inside and outside director ownership for the equity
REIT group. These results provide evidence of increased alignment by inside directors
and greater monitoring for outside directors as the amount of wealth they have at




















































OLS Analysis of the Market Pricing of Director Representation for Equity and Hybrid-Mortgage REITs
Obs. Intercept t-Stat %OUT , 50 t-Stat %OUT , 50 t-Stat
Panel A: Outside Representation
Equity 404 0.979** 7.8 0.005* 2.0 20.007* 22.0
Hybrid-Mortgage 286 0.995** 8.0 0.001 0.4 20.003 20.9
Panel B: Inside Director Representation
Equity 404 1.051** 12.2 0.003 1.4 20.003 20.5
Hybrid-Mortgage 286 1.043** 16.9 20.001 20.7 0.007 0.9
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The coefﬁcient estimates for %OUT , 50 represent the relation between market-to-book ratios and outside director representation on insider
controlled boards. The relation between market-to-book ratios and outside director representation on outsider controlled boards is obtained by
summing the coefﬁcient estimates for %OUT , 50 and %OUT . 50. The coefﬁcient estimates for %INS , 50 and %INS . 50 are treated similarly
















































OLS Analysis of the Market Pricing of Board of Director Percentage and Total Dollar Value of Stock Holdings for
Equity and Hybrid-Mortgage REITs
Obs. Intercept t-Stat %OWN-INS t-Stat %OWN-DOA t-Stat %OWN-OUT t-Stat
Panel A: Board of Director Percentage Stock Ownership
Equity 404 1.200** 23.4 20.249* 21.8 210.533** 22.9 0.887 1.7
Hybrid-Mortgage 274 1.034** 14.2 0.060 0.3 22.377 21.7 21.693 21.1
Panel B: Board of Director Total Dollar Stockholdings
Equity 389 0.477** 3.7 0.034** 3.7 20.011** 23.2 0.020** 3.2
Hybrid-Mortgage 261 0.745** 3.7 0.017 1.1 20.012** 23.4 0.001 0.1
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
%OWN-INS 5 Percentage of outstanding shares owned by inside directors.
%OWN-DOA 5 Percentage of outstanding shares owned by afﬁliated directors.
%OWN-OUT 5 Percentage of outstanding shares owned by outside directors.
$OWN-INS 5 Natural log of total dollar value of stock ownership by inside directors.
$OWN-DOA 5 Natural log of total dollar value of stock ownership by directors of afﬁliated companies.




















































OLS Analysis of the Market Pricing of the Interaction Between Board Composition and the Percentage and Total








Panel A: Interaction between board composition and percentage stock ownership
Equity 404 1.191** 24.8 20.120 20.5 233.039* 22.0 1.234 1.7
Hybrid-Mortgage 274 1.027** 15.5 0.157 0.5 215.739 21.4 22.408 21.0
Panel B: Interaction between board composition and total dollar value of stock ownership
Equity 389 0.168 0.9 0.084** 5.2 0.052** 3.5 0.066** 5.4
Hybrid-Mortgage 273 0.532* 2.1 0.034 1.7 0.017 0.7 0.030 1.7
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
%INS*%OWN 5 Percentage of inside directors on board multiplied by percent of outstanding shares owned.
%DOA*%OWN 5 Percentage of afﬁliated directors on board multiplied by percent of outstanding shares owned.
%OUT*%OWN 5 Percentage of outsiders on board multiplied by percent of outstanding shares owned.
%INS*$OWN 5 Percentage of insiders on board multiplied by natural log of dollar value of outstanding shares owned.
%DOA*$OWN 5 Percentage of afﬁliated directors on board multiplied by natural log of dollar value of outstanding shares owned.
%OUT*$OWN 5 Percentage of outsiders on board multiplied by natural log of dollar value of outstanding shares owned.BOARD OF DIRECTOR MONITORING AND FIRM VALUE IN REITS 425
group. A negative relation is observed for the dollar ownership of afﬁliated directors
for both REIT groups.
The inﬂuence of the interaction of both board composition and director stock
ownership as a percentage of shareholder equity on REIT value is examined in Panel
A of Exhibit 6 for the equity and hybrid-mortgage REIT groups. A signiﬁcant negative
relationship is documented between equity REIT market-to-book ratios and the
interaction of the level of afﬁliated director representation on the board and their
proportion of stock ownership. All but one of the annual coefﬁcients is negative for
this model.
Panel B of Exhibit 6 presents the market pricing of board composition and director
stock ownership measured as the total dollar value of their stock holdings. A
signiﬁcant positive relationship exists between equity REIT market-to-book ratios and
the interaction of the level of inside, afﬁliated and outside director representation on
the board and their respective total dollar values of shareholdings. All but four of the
coefﬁcients are negative, providing further evidence that the market perceives the total
dollar value of director ownership as a key measure of director alignment with
shareholders.
Conclusion
Evidence provided by McIntosh, Rogers, Sirmans and Liang (1994) suggest that
internal monitoring by directors can act to create shareholder wealth in REITs and
supports the widely held belief that outside directors serve to enhance shareholder
value. This determines the impact of REIT board of director composition and
characteristics on REIT value as measured by a ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio. This
analysis is performed for 135 REITs with over 4,500 director years of service for the
period 1980–94.
Results show that increased outsider representation on the board of directors leads to
increased market-to-book ratios as outside representation climbs towards 50%.
However, this relation does not persist as outside director representation rises above
the 50% level. These results provide evidence that the role of monitor played by
outside directors is appreciated by the market. However, as this outside representation
on the board becomes excessive, the beneﬁts of additional monitoring provided by
increased numbers of outside directors declines. In addition, evidence is provided that
the market discounts the stock of REITs with increased numbers of afﬁliated directors.
Further support for the increased alignment associated with greater stock ownership
is provided by the documentation of a positive relationship between REIT market-to-
book ratios and the total dollar values of director stock ownership. As the level of
wealth at risk in the ﬁrm increases for these directors, their levels of oversight and
monitoring increase proportionately.426 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Notes
1 For a more detailed discussion of the REIT institutional form, see the Internal Revenue Code
(Sections 356-358).
2 REITs are not the only ﬁrms that may have assets that are hard to value. For example, industrial
ﬁrms may have hard-to-value machinery and high-tech ﬁrms may have hard-to-value patents
and other technology.
3 See, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) for further analysis on the effectiveness of these
other mechanisms to align management with shareholders.
4 The perceived importance of outside directors on REIT boards is illustrated in the Statement
of Policy of the North American Securities Administrators Association regarding REITs. Section
3(b) states that a majority of the trustees of a REIT shall be independent and all committees
established by the trust should consist of a majority of independent trustees.
5 Captive REITs and captive-ﬁnancing afﬁliates are REITs that have interwoven business
relationships with their sponsors and advisors.
6 To be considered an equity REIT, at least 75% of the REITs investment portfolio must consist
of income producing real property. Mortgage REITs lie on the opposite end of the spectrum
with at least 75% of their assets consisting of mortgage instruments, while hybrid REITs fall
between equity and mortgage REITs.
7 It is important to note that some REITs will appear in the sample for most of the ﬁfteen years
examined, while some will only appear once. The results will be biased towards those REITs
appearing more times in the sample. However, alternative analysis employing averages that
condense each REIT’s annual data items to a single observation reveal that this bias is not
signiﬁcant.
8 Hybrid and mortgage REITs, hereafter referred to as hybrid-mortgage REITs, are examined
together.
9 All afﬁliated directors in this analysis served on boards of captive REITs or groups of afﬁliated
REITs managed by a single advisor.
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